

EASA

Reference: FOCA AltMoC SORA 2.0 Containment

1 Purpose

These instructions establish an alternative means of compliance (AltMoC) to chapter 2.5.3 Step 9 of AMC1 to Article 11 of (EU) 2019/947 or the JARUS Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) v2.0 methodology.

According to Traficom assessment, the requirement of enhanced containment under point 2.5.3(c) of AMC1 to Article 11 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 is currently triggered in situations, where it does not result in any significant safety gain.

2 List of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are within this AltMoC:

Abbreviation Definition

AltMoC	Alternative Means of Compliance
AMC	Acceptable Means of Compliance
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
ATC	Air Traffic Control
CAT	Commercial Air Transport
COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf
EASA	European Aviation Safety Agency
GA	General Aviation
GPS	Global Positioning System
JARUS	Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems
MAC	Mid-Air Collision
RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
SAIL	Specific Assurance and Integrity Level
SORA	Specific Operations Risk Assessment
TLS	Target Level of Safety

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System

3 Introduction

This Alternative Means of Compliance (AltMoC) is intended to change the containment requirements and the assessment of their need as currently found in chapter 2.5.3 Step 9 of AMC1 to Article 11 of (EU) 2019/947 or the JARUS Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) v2.0 methodology.

Currently all Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) used in the specific category must adhere to the points 2.5.3(a)&(b) of the requirements. This is seen as proportional by FOCA and only a small addition for clarity is added. On the other hand, point 2.5.3(c) requires enhanced containment performance when certain conditions are met. However, by the latest understanding of Traficom, enhanced containment is triggered in situations where the actual risk of the operation does not justify its applicability and the containment requirements of points (a)&(b) would be sufficient.

This Alternative Means of Compliance (AltMoC) focuses on changing the assessment triggers in point 2.5.3(c) which mandate enhanced containment from certain UAS operators. No change in the technical implementation requirements of the containment systems is proposed.

The purpose of having containment requirements at all is that the rest of the SORA risk assessment focuses on the operational area, which could be thought of as the most likely area at risk. To ensure that SORA does not leave out any significant risks unassessed, certain questions should be considered, such as:

- What if the aircraft leaves this assessed operational area?
- Are there areas of credible significant risk in proximity to the operational area?

4 Alternative means of compliance, based on FOCA assessment:

4.1 AltMoc terms and conditions

The use of the male gender should be understood to include male and female persons.

The most frequent abbreviations used by the EASA are listed here:
easa.europa.eu/abbreviations.

When used throughout the AltMoC the terms such as «shall, must, will, may, should, could, etc.» shall have the meaning as defined in the English Style Guide of the European Commission.

4.2 Legal references

Commission Regulation (EU) No 947/2019:

- Article 11
- AMC1 Article 11

5 Proposed Target Level of Safety TLS for the AltMoC

The general qualitative target level of safety (TLS) in Article 11(3) of (EU) 2019/947 is set to be equivalent to that of manned aviation.

“The assessment shall propose a target level of safety, which shall be equivalent to the safety level in manned aviation, in view of the specific characteristics of UAS operation.”

Keeping in mind the goal of achieving this equivalency, the considered TLS for ground and air risk are further detailed in the following sections.

5.1 Ground risk TLS

For risks to third parties on the ground the equivalent risk is assessed in JARUS AMC RPAS.1309 issue 2 as $1.0 * 10^{-6}$ deaths / flight hour for manned aviation.

5.2 Air risk TLS

The TLS per UAS flight hour for air risk in this AltMoC is $1.0 * 10^{-7}$ Mid Air Collisions (MAC) with General Aviation (GA) aircraft per flight hour and $1.0 * 10^{-9}$ MAC with Commercial Air Transport (CAT) aircraft per flight hour. These values are commonly accepted as TLS Lin, Xun & Fulton, Neale & Westcott, Mark. (2009). Target Level of Safety Measures in Air Transportation – Review, Validation and Recommendations. With conservative assumptions of every collision being catastrophic and 500 passengers for each CAT aircraft and 5 passengers for each GA aircraft the fatalities per UAS flight hour would be:

$$500 \text{ passengers} * 10^{-9} \text{ MAC}_{FLH} = 5 * 10^{-7} \text{ Dead}_{FLH}$$

$$5 \text{ passengers} * 10^{-7} \text{ MAC}_{FLH} = 5 * 10^{-7} \text{ Dead}_{FLH}$$

Measured in deaths per UAS flight hour, the targets are the same for both encounter types, less than the ground risk TLS and equal to the safety level in manned aviation.

6 Understanding of unmanned aircraft fly-away probability

For an unmanned aircraft to fly-away out of the assessed operational area the following sequence of events must happen:

1. The control of the operation/drone is lost. Probability of this happening is directly linked by definition to the SAIL of an operation. For example, a SAIL II operation is assumed to lose control less than once in a hundred flight hours. (Probability of loss of control of an operation rate equals $10^{-\text{SAIL}}$);

SAIL	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Probability of loss of control per flight hour	10^{-1}	10^{-2}	10^{-3}	10^{-4}	10^{-5}	10^{-6}

2. The loss of control does not lead to a crash inside the operational volume or ground risk buffer;
3. The containment mitigations applied to the operation fail, including the basic containment, since it is applicable to all UAS subject to a SORA;
4. The aircraft flies outside of the ground risk buffer.

The number of different failures or combinations of failures that could lead to this chain of events and a fly-away can be estimated. UAS are complex systems that can have many different types of failures, but some generalizations can be made to assess what failures may lead to a fly-away.

6.1 Potential failure types that could lead to a fly-away:

	Failure type	Potential failure effect
1.	GPS failure	total loss, inaccuracy.
2.	Internal Navigation System	total loss, inaccuracy, drifting.
3.	Flight Control	last input stays, full power, power off, control surface actuation, etc.
4.	Pilot error	incorrect input, incorrect navigation, flight planning failure
5.	Environment (Wind, Electromagnetic interference, Temperature)	drifting out of area, battery drained early

6.	Data Link	fly straight, hover, return to home, gain altitude
7.	Other potential failure	

These failure types need to be mitigated by containment requirements.

The assumption taken is that there could be up to 10 different failure types in an unmanned aircraft operation that can lead to a fly-away either individually or in combination.

This AltMoC proposes no changes in the technical implementation requirements of the containment systems, but addressed only the trigger criteria. The following presents an analysis of the estimated containment performance to determine whether the current targets are adequate and proportional to the overall risk to the system.

6.2 “Basic containment” - SORA 2.5.3(b)

“No probable failure of the UAS or any external system supporting the operation shall lead to operation outside of the operational volume.”

Basic containment is required for all UAS operations in the specific category and sets the minimum level of containment performance. This requirement sets a total allowed probability of single failures that may lead to a fly-away. Single failures leading to fly-away are still allowed to occur, but their probability should be “no probable”, meaning Remote.

- “Probable” failure means occurrence every 10^{-3} / flight hours
- “Remote” failure means occurrence every 10^{-4} / flight hours

In combination with the assumption of up to 10 potential Remote failure conditions in UAS operation that can lead to a fly-away, the basic containment requirement would set a fly-away rate outside of the operational volume of less than 10^{-3} / flight hour. However, every operation is planned with a ground risk buffer that is meant to capture the most likely crash area of an operation in a loss of control event. The ground risk buffer can be estimated to contain 90% of all loss of control situations and subsequent crashes inside it due to gravity and the attempts of the remote pilot to end the flight.

Therefore, Basic containment is estimated to reach a containment performance of 10^{-4} /flight hour for flyaway events outside of the ground risk buffer.

6.3 “Enhanced containment” – SORA 2.5.3(c)

“The probability of leaving the operational volume shall be less than 10^{-4} /FH.”

No single failure of the UAS or any external system supporting the operation shall lead to operation outside of the **ground risk buffer.**

Software (SW) and Airborne Electronic Hardware (AEH) whose development error(s) could directly lead to operations outside of the ground risk buffer shall be developed to an industry standard or methodology recognized as adequate by the competent authority.”

Enhanced containment requirements require that two independent failures happening at the same time are only allowed to lead to a fly-away. The requirements are also setting a quantitative operational volume containment requirement. The fact that no single failure is allowed to lead to fly-away means that there should at least be an independent Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) level (10^{-2} failure rate) back-up system to end the flight within the ground risk buffer. In combination these two requirements are assumed to combine into a fly-away probability outside of the ground risk buffer of less than 10^{-6} /flight hour.

$P_{\text{fly out from operational volume}} * P_{\text{fly out from ground risk buffer}} \rightarrow 10^{-4} * 10^{-2} = 10^{-6}$ /FLH probability of fly-away

The point 2.5.3(c) also includes the triggers for applying Enhanced containment, which based on Traficom's experience and analysis are not proportional to the actual risk posed by most UAS operations. This AltMoC changes these triggers, which are:

Where adjacent areas are:

- i. **Gatherings of people** unless already approved for operations over gathering of people OR
- ii. **ARC-d** unless the residual ARC is ARC-d

In **populated environments** where:


- i. **M1 mitigation** has been applied to lower the GRC
- ii. Operating in a **controlled ground area**

7 Estimating outcomes of worst-case scenarios for fly-away events: Air risk

The JARUS group set to amend the current Step 9 has considered a variety of worst-case scenarios to test whether containment requirements more stringent than Basic Containment would ever be required. Two of them are described in this section.

Example 1

The most extreme scenario considers an operation north of the Las Vegas airport (LAS), which is intended to be confined to the small red circle. **LAS** had 543,391 yearly landings and departures on average between 2017-2019 according to "FAA Air Traffic by numbers 2022". This is on average 1489 landings and departures every day or roughly ~ 1.0 movement every minute. The heat map background shows annualized flight tracks from official FAA surveillance systems between the surface and 1000 feet AGL. Traffic within this Class B surface area is highly proceduralized and concentrated in specific locations: arrivals to runways 19R/19L, departures from runways 1R/1L, a helipad (red dot near center) and a defined VFR helicopter tour route above the Las Vegas Strip (diagonal and slightly curved paths from left edge to top-center). The greatest risk occurs with a loss of containment that proceeds from the operational area towards the airport CAT traffic. While the helicopter routes cover a larger sector next to the operation the TLS and density are not as high as for the CAT traffic.



Using the assumptions in the previous section:

- Basic containment is applied;
- In the event of a loss of containment, there is a 25% (sector $90^\circ/360^\circ$) chance that the UAS flies in the direction of the airport and a 48% (sector $173^\circ/360^\circ$) chance of flying towards the helicopter routes;
- Loss of containment is linear, and the UAS crosses two flight paths, for a total exposure time of 40 seconds (0.011 hours, assuming a 1000-foot distance across the landing path at 30kts);
- ARC-d value for Airport = 10 (WCV/FLH) (The ARC values are based on the worst cases seen during airspace classification studies "[Likelihood of Unmitigated Collision risk for UAS in Defined Airspace Volumes, 2020](#)");
- ARC-c value for Helicopter routes = 1;
- $p(\text{NMAC}|\text{WCV}) = 0.1$ ([Well-clear recommendation for small unmanned aircraft systems based on unmitigated collision risk, Journal of Air Transportation, 2018](#));
- $p(\text{MAC}|\text{NMAC}) = 0.01$ for UAS in 1m and 3m categories ("[Correlated Encounter Model for Cooperative Aircraft in the National Airspace System, MIT, 2008](#)").
- $p(\text{fatality}|\text{MAC}) = 0.1$ ([Airborne Collision Severity Evaluation, ASSURE, 2022](#))

The probability of a lethal MAC is the product of the values of each of the above eight bullets, including the exposure time:


$$(10^{-4})(0.25)(0.011)(10)(0.1)(0.01)(0.1) = 2.75 \times 10^{-10} \text{ for CAT traffic}$$

$$(10^{-4})(0.48)(0.011)(1)(0.1)(0.01)(0.1) = 5.28 \times 10^{-11} \text{ for GA traffic}$$

Example 2

San Francisco airport (SFO) had 462,422 yearly landings and departures on average between 2017-2019. This is on average 1267 landings and departures every day or roughly ~ 0.88 movements every minute.

The preceding assumptions were also applied to the region SFO, depicted with a similar heat map at below right. In this scenario, the drone is again operating within the red circle, with a loss of containment from northwest clockwise to northeast (yellow arrows) presenting the greatest risk to the dual parallel final approaches.



Using the same assumptions:

- Basic containment is applied;
- In the event of a loss of containment, there is a 25% chance that the UAS flies in the direction of an intersecting flight path;
- Loss of containment is linear, and the UAS crosses two flight paths, for a total exposure time of 40 seconds (0.011 hours);
- ARC value = 10;
- $p(\text{NMAC}|\text{WVC}) = 0.1$;
- $p(\text{MAC}|\text{NMAC}) = 0.01$.
- $p(\text{fatality}|\text{MAC}) = 0.1$

In this case, the probability of a lethal MAC as the product of the values of each of the above six bullets, including the exposure time is:

$(10^{-4})(0.25)(1)(0.1)(0.01)(0.1)(0.011) = 2.75 \times 10^{-10}$ for CAT traffic.

As in the previous example, the basic containment is proven to be enough to achieve the required TLS.

7.1 Comparison to situation in Finland

Both extreme US airport examples show that the TLS order of magnitude is met with only the basic containment. The busiest airport in Finland is Helsinki-Vantaa airport HEL with 182 647 landings and departures 2024 (on the historically busiest year 2019, according to Finavia's statistics 2019, 95 097 landings). This is half of the traffic to Las Vegas airport and so should achieve a similar, but slightly safer result.

Another way to calculate the risk would be to imagine 1000 drones circling around Helsinki-Vantaa airport continuously with only Basic containment requirements implemented and calculating how long it would take until a MAC is expected to happen.

$$\frac{1}{2.75 * 10^{-9} * 1000 \text{ drones}} = 363,636 \text{ hours} = 41 \text{ years}$$

Therefore, it is concluded that Basic containment requirements are enough to guarantee the TLS for air risk, independent of the ARC of the adjacent airspace below 500 feet AGL. The limitation of this AltMoC to below 500 feet is due to the air risk analysis method not being suitable for the less structured airspace higher above.

8 Estimating outcomes of worst-case scenarios for fly-away events: Ground risk

8.1 M1 mitigation as a trigger for Enhanced containment

The triggering of Enhanced containment always by the application of M1 mitigation within populated areas can be shown to be not required:

- Each Ground Risk Class (GRC) score mitigation of 1 corresponds to an order of magnitude reduction in risk. In the case of M1 mitigation "reduction of people at risk" this means a reduction of population density at risk within the operating area to 10% of the originally estimated population or, put another way, a factor 10 higher population density outside of the operating area;
- As shown above, a basic assumption is that the ground risk buffer provides 90% probability of ending the flight within it;
- Therefore, a Low Robustness M1 mitigation of -1 GRC increases the surrounding population density by a factor of 10, but the ground risk buffer offers a reduction of risk to adjacent areas by a factor of 10 ending up at no increase for the surrounding areas. When it comes to general timeactivity pattern sheltering arguments for M1

mitigation, these would also be applicable to areas outside of the ground risk buffer and would not cause any increase in the population density difference.

It can be concluded that only M1 mitigations of Medium or High robustness that do not also apply to adjacent areas within populated areas would potentially increase the surrounding population density enough to cause a significant increase in the assessed risk to adjacent areas.

8.2 Worst case scenario assessment for Enhanced containment from ground risk


The Enhanced containment is considered to be meant for situations where the ground risk outside of the ground risk buffer is assessed to be considerably high. Practically this means a large number of people right next to the ground risk buffer. A worst case scenario example is a gathering of people next to a controlled ground area.

Therefore, the worst-case scenarios to assess are controlled ground areas inside densely populated areas (city centers) or operations next to gatherings of people. The examples later show how only large gatherings of people ~20,000 ppl or more will move the assessed risk significantly enough to warrant triggering of Enhanced containment.

The following worst case ground risk containment scenarios show examples of using a proposed 1km distance to quantitatively evaluate surrounding gatherings of people and populated areas. The proposed size of adjacent area of 1 km for ground area considers what would be the closest acceptable safety buffer from a gathering of people, beyond which a gathering of people would not be adjacent to the operational volume. This 1km buffer is selected to be more conservative towards gatherings of people than the one defined in (EU) 2019/947 AMC1 UAS.OPEN.030(1) for subcategory A2 UAS, because the trigger for gatherings is adapted to only large gatherings.

Furthermore, the maximum dimensions of gatherings of people are rarely multiple kilometers in size so as to occupy major parts of the adjacent areas. Crowds that large would be pragmatically possible to avoid with prior knowledge of an event taking place (e.g. concert, trade show, sports event).

8.2.1 Example 1: Street parade Zürich around 200,000 people




Adjacent area – Ground risk

				A_{OPS+GRB}	
				(km²)	A_{ADJ} (km²)
				0.3	4.49
	Description	Area km²	Density	Pop	% of A_{ADJ} 1km
#2	Assembly Openair Frauenfeld (Blue area)	0.81	185185	150000	18.04%
#1	Average 1km A _{ADJ} base population	4.49	1073	4820	100%
#3	All together	4.49	34481	154820	

The OpenAir Frauenfeld example also shows that there is a minimum increase in population density of factor 10 or a factor 100 measured within 1km of the operational volume measured from the average base population density(#1). The difference could also be much more if the operational area is a controlled ground area.

8.2.3 Example 3: Stadium Letzigrund around 30,000 people



Adjacent area – Ground risk

				A_{OPS+GRB} (km²)	A_{ADJ} (km²)
				0.69	4.58
	Description	Area km²	Density	Pop	% of ADJ 1km
#2	Assembly Stadium Letzigrund (Blue area)	0.81	37037	30000	17.69%
#1	Average 1km A _{ADJ} base population	4.58	9031	41360	
#3	All together	4.58	15893	71360	

The Stadium example shows that a 30,000ppl gathering inside an already densely populated area does not significantly increase the population density measured within 1km of the operational volume. However, as with the previous examples the difference could also be much more if the operational area is a controlled ground area.

9 Changes to AMC1 to Article 11 point 2.5.3 on Enhanced containment triggers

Supported by the considerations described in the chapters above, the changes from this AltMoC can be summarised as follows:

For clarity, the following requirement is added to point 2.5.3(b):

“When the aircraft leaves the operational volume, an immediate end of the flight must be initiated.” The current text in point 2.5.3(c):

<p>(c) The following three safety requirements apply for operations conducted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where adjacent areas are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Gatherings of people unless already approved for operations over gathering of people OR ii. ARC-d unless the residual ARC is ARC-d • In populated environments where <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. M1 mitigation has been applied to lower the GRC ii. Operating in a controlled ground area
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is to be replaced by the following new triggers for Enhanced containment:

(c) The following three safety requirements apply for operations:

- Where a large assembly of people (~20,000 ppl or more) is present within 1km distance from the operational volume, unless already approved for operations over assemblies of people. Applicant has a procedures in place to check this before each operation.
- Where adjacent areas are populated areas:
 - i. And a M1 mitigation of Medium or High robustness has been applied, unless the mitigation applies also to adjacent areas;
 - ii. Operation is conducted over a controlled ground area.
- Height of the operational volume is above 150m altitude AGL, where adjacent airspace is ARC-D. ATC or Competent authority permit is needed before the operation.
- With an UAS larger than the 3m class flown in airport environment.

New Step #9 section 2.5.3 according to the AltMoC

a) The objective of this section is to address the risk posed by a loss of control of the operation resulting in an infringement of the adjacent areas on the ground and/or adjacent airspace. These areas may vary with different flight phases.

b) Safety requirements for containment are:

When the aircraft leaves the operational volume, an immediate end of the flight must be initiated.

1. No probable failure of the UAS or any external system supporting the operation shall lead to operation outside of the operational volume.

Compliance with the requirement above shall be substantiated by a design and installation appraisal and shall minimally include:

- design and installation features (independence, separation and redundancy);
- any relevant particular risk (e.g. hail, ice, snow, electro-magnetic interference...) associated with the ConOps.

c) The following three safety requirements apply for operations:

- Where a large assembly of people (~20,000 ppl or more) is present within 1km distance from the operational volume, unless already approved for operations over assemblies of people. Applicant has a procedures in place to check this before each operation.
- Where adjacent areas are populated areas:
 - i. And a M1 mitigation of Medium or High robustness has been applied, unless the mitigation applies also to adjacent areas;
 - ii. Operation is conducted over a controlled ground area.
- Height of the operational volume is above 150m altitude AGL, where adjacent airspace is ARC-D.
- ATC or Competent authority permit is needed before the operation.
- With an UAS larger than the 3m class flown in airport environment.

1. The probability of leaving the operational volume shall be less than $10^{-4}/FH$.
2. No single failure^k of the UAS or any external system supporting the operation shall lead to operation outside of the ground risk buffer.
Compliance with the requirements above shall be substantiated by analysis and/or test data with supporting evidence.
3. Software (SW) and Airborne Electronic Hardware (AEH) whose development error(s) could directly lead to operations outside of the ground risk buffer shall be developed to an industry standard or methodology recognized as adequate by the competent authority.

As it not possible to anticipate all local situations, the operator, the competent authority and the ANSP should use sound judgement with regards to the definition of "adjacent airspace" as well as "adjacent areas". For example, for a small UAS with limited range, it is not intended to include busy airport/heliport environments 30 kilometres away. The airspace bordering the UAS volume of operation should be the starting point of the determination of adjacent airspace. In exceptional cases, the airspace(s) beyond those bordering the UAS volume of operation may also have to be considered.